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Abstract 
This is the first intensive study which is expected to totally illustrate how 
Japanese companies design and use capita1 budgeting systems. There are 718 
manufacturing J apanese comp副lIeslisted at the main section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. Questionnaire was sent to al these companies in August 1996 
加 d205 of them replied. Effectively ana1ysed were 201. The questionnaire was 
organized to be comparable with the existing capita1 budgeting survey under-
taken in the UK by Pike and Wolfe (1986). 
The paper deals with three major sections of the questionnaire research. In 
the first section， general questions are asked with regard to formal information 
systems， such as the adoption of project appraisal techniques， risk analysis and 
post-completion auditing. The second section asks about the organizationa1 de-
cision process in which investment projects are generated， developed and a。
cepted. Finally， recent trends of the sophistication of capita1 budgeting prac-
tice are ana1ysed. Sophistication of capita1 budgeting practice is seen in J apan. 
But its pace is slower. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Capital investment is an engine for corporate growth. Long-term corporate 
success is dependent upon the effectiveness of capital investment decisions. 
Moreover， making a capital investment decision is now seen as embodying cor-
porate strategy per se (Barwise et a/.， 1986， and Marsh et a/.， 1988). Whi1e the 
concept of strategy is often ambiguous and therefore dificult to understand， 
capital investment projects are quite visible and easier to deal with. Resear-
chers now talk about the more dynamic and complicated relationships between 
investment decisions and corporate strategy in terms of “strategic investment 
decisions" (Butler et al.， 1993， Carr et al.， 1994， and Oldcorn and Parker， 
1996). 
In order to implement capital investment projects successfully， it is necessa・
ry for a company to design an effective capital budgeting system in accordance 
with .corporate strategy. A focus must be given not narrowly to formal informa-
tion systems， but more broadly to organizational goal systems， for strategy is 
formulated on the later. Traditiona11y， studies in capital budgeting have 
almost exc1usively focused on the technical and procedural aspects of project 
appraisal， aswas criticized by King (1975). Such an approach cannot be effec-
tive unless these systems are consistent with existing goals and objectives (Pike 
and Wolfe， 1988， p.24). Seen in such terms， describing how various organiza-
tiona1 subunits are committed to the investment decision process also becomes 
an important issue. It is organizational participants that actually give influence 
on goals and objectives and use information for investment decision making. 
Information systems， goal systems and organizational subunits are， therefore， 
the key factors which constitute a total capital budgeting system. Without 
relevant systems， investment decisions cannot be made effectively even though 
a sound strategy exists. 
Many empirical studies have ever been undertaken in capital budgeting on 
the basis of questionnaire. These studies have focused on either American (e.g. 
Scapens et al.， 1982) or British (e.g. Mi1s and Herbert， 1987) companies. 
There exists， however， no major questionnaire research in Japan， be it in En-
glish or in J apanese. This is， indeed， the first intensive study that is expected to 
totally illustrate how J apanese companies design and practise capital budget-
ing systems. 
There are 718 manufacturin 
Size of Capital Budget (1m) Number of Firms % 
10，000 plus 64 32.82 
1，000 to 10，000 96 49.23 
500 to 1，000 22 11.28 
100 to 500 12 6.15 
Below 100 0.51 
Total Usable Response 195 100 
to This Question 
This paper presents the results of the questionnaire research in details and 
tries to understand why the J apanese companies practise capital budgeting in a 
certain manner. 
In the paper， a comparative method is adopted in order to clarify the char困
acteristic features of Japanese capital budgeting. For this purpose， the ques-
tionnaire was made based on that used in the study undertaken by Pike and 
Wolfe (1988). So a copy of the questionnaire was directly obtained from 
Professor Richard Pike. The reason why their study was chosen as a compara-
tive standard is that they had sent questionnaires to large UK companies for 
many times for the purpose of longitudinal analysis and that most of their 
study results were quite reliably publicized. Pike has already published two 
books on capital budgeting survey (Pike， 1982， and Pike and Wolfe， 1988). 
This paper deals with the following three major sections of the question-
naire research.1 In the first section， general questions are asked with regard to 
formal information systems， such as the adoption of project appraisal tech-
niques， risk analysis and post-completion auditing. This section is a compara-
tive study between J apan and the UK. The second section originally asks about 
the organizational decision proc回sin which investment projects are generated， 
developed and accepted. More characteristic features of the Japanese compa-
nies are closed up. Finally in the third section， recent trends of capital budget-
ing practice are analysed. Some of the UK data are compared with the 
Japanese ones. 
1. PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
Planning and Control Procedures 
In the questionnaire sent， questions starts with planning and control contex-
ts of capital investment. Table 1 shows how the J apanese listed manufacturing 
lQuestionnaire consisted of the four sections. The last section dealt with foreign direct 
investment which had almost no relations with the study of Pike and Wolfe (1988). 
The result of that section wil be published in another opportunity in the future. 
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Table 1 CAPITAL BUDGETING PLANNING AND CONTROL PROCEDURES 
Japan 196 UK 1986 
Firms with: Total No % Yes % Yes% 
Capital budget looking beyond 2 years 19 86 43.22 13 56.78 64 
An up-to-date capital budgeting manual 200 73 36.50 127 63.50 84 
A formal screning and reviewing body 19 5 27.64 14 72.36 83 
At least one person fuly 19 108 54.27 91 45.73 26 
engaged in capital budgeting 
A regular review of hurdle rates 19 10 50.25 9 49.75 71 
Reconsidering major projects after 20 34 17.0 16 83.0 85 
approval if cost over runs are likely 
Monitoring project performance 20 25 12.50 175 87.50 84 
Requirement of post-completion 198 81 40.91 17 59.09 64 
audits on most major projects 
firms design formal capital budgeting systems in the planning and control con・
text. To make the Japanese data comparable with the British case， the results 
obtained by Pike and Wolfe (1988) are叫soshown in the table.2 As regards the 
planning systems for capital budgeting町・M ・thefirst five questions in Table 1ー，
the Japanese companies had in most cases the lower scores， even compared 
with the UK data ten years before. The only higher score was the case that the 
firms had “at least one person fully engaged in capital budgeting". 
One， of the problematic findings here is that the term “capital budget" or 
“capital budgeting" was not fully understood in Japanese by the respondents. 
This may partly be due to the design of questionnaire， most of which was di-
rectly translated from English， iふ theone Pike and Wolfe (1988) used， into 
J apanese so as to maintain comparability. A more significant reason may be 
the fact that Japanese companies often have their own terminology which 
could not be used outside the organization. The level of standardization across 
companies may not be so high in J apan. This is quite a possible case， given that 
these companies maintain so田ca11edlife圃timeemploymentー oneof the typical 
characteristics of the J apanese陶stylemanagement. 
Table 1 a1so shows the results concerning the control procedures (the last 
three questions). More than 80% of the Japanese companies monitored 
project performance and reconsidered major projects after approval if cost 
over runs were likely. The results of these questions were comparable with the 
Pike and Wolfe (1988) study. As was the case with capital budget， the term 
“post-audit" or“post-completion audit" was not well understood by the 
respondents. The standardization of terminology may need to be required in 
Japan. 
2Al the comparable UK data used in the tables as UK 1986 are adopted from Pike and 
Wolfe (198). These data are expressed in Italics in the tables in order for them to be 
easily recognized. 
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In Table 2， simi1ar problems also occurred. The term “formal" was misun-
derstood by some Japanese respondents. One wrote a note on the question-
nalre: 
“Does‘formally' mean outside the company?" 
The dataof “a formal financial evaluation" and “a formal analysis of risk" in 
Table 2 were possibly underestimated due to this reason. But other data in the 
table were comparable with the UK data. 
Evaluation Techniques 
Table 3 shows how Japanese companies adopted project appraisal tech-
niques. As in the case with the UK， the most popular technique was the pay-
Table 2 CAPITAL BUDGETING EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
Japan 1996 
Firms which require: Total No Yes Rarely Often Mostly Always 
A specific search and 200 8 192 35 41 69 47 
screening of alternatives 100% 4.00 96.00 17.50 20.50 34.50 23.50 
UK 1986 100% 2 98 9 22 39 28 
A formal financial evaluation 197 43 154 36 29 43 46 
100% 21.83 78.17 18.27 14.72 21.83 23.35 
UK 1986 100% 。100 。 O 13 87 
A formal analysis of risk 197 48 149 45 28 46 30 
100% 24.37 75.63 22.84 14.21 23.35 15.23 
UK 1986 100% 14 86 19 17 28 22 
Analysis under diferent 200 12 188 39 56 52 41 
assumptions (e.g. best/worst) 100% 6.00 94.00 19.50 28.00 26.00 20.50 
UK 1986 100% 7 93 18 29 24 22 
Incorporating inflation 199 62 137 53 29 35 20 
100% 31.16 68.84 26.63 14.57 17.59 10.05 
Table 3 PROJECT EVALUATION TECHNIQUES 
Japan 1996 
Firms which use: Total No Yes Rarely Often Mostly Always 
Payback 200 7 193 14 17 56 106 
100% 3.50 96.50 7.00 8.50 28.00 53.00 
UK 1986 100% 8 92 5 16 24 47 
A verage accounting 193 41 152 32 36 32 52 
rate of return 100% 21.24 78.76 16.58 18.65 16.58 26.94 
UK 1986 100% 44 56 13 15 10 18 
Internal rate of return 190 89 101 32 21 17 31 
100% 46.84 53.16 16.84 11.05 8.95 16.32 
UK 1986 100% 25 75 9 11 13 42 
Net present value 181 98 83 28 21 12 22 
100% 54.14 45.86 15.47 11.60 6.63 12.15 
UK 1986 100% 32 68 16 15 14 23 
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back method (96.50%). Almost al the Japanese companies used this tech-
nique. And more than half the respondents always used it. Another accrual ac-
counting method， i.e. the accounting rate of return， was more popular in 
Japan than in the UK (78.76% vis-a-vis 56%)， given that the discounted cash 
fiow techniques， i.e.the internal rate of return (lRR) and the net present value 
(NPV)， were less so. 
Such a resu1t is quite consistent with the discussion presented by Takatera 
and Yamamoto (1989). From a social and cu1tural viewpoint， they insist that 
J apanese companies rely more on the accrual accounting techniques than the 
DCF ones. As they have noted: 
The way of thinking implied by DCF techniques， which are based on fu-
ture economic values， is not easily legitimated in a Japanese context， while 
accrual accounting methods are perceived as having greater relevance. 
ROI， for example， and PB which is an arithmetic reciprocal of ROI， can 
easily be compared with the performance of competitors or the averaged 
level of the industry (Takatera and Yamamoto， 1989， p.246). 
Their point is that as the J apanese companies are more looking at their compe-
titors than their own future， easily comparable accrual accounting numbers 
are preferred. Whatever the reason， the preference of accrual accounting 
methods were seen in the Japanese companies. 
Among the DCF techniques， the IRR (53.16%) is more widely used than 
the NPV (45.86%)， aswas the case in the UK (75% vis-a-vis 68%). As is point-
ed out by Pike (1982， pp. 54-5)， the“rate" is preferred to the“amount". But 
the significantly fewer J apanese companies were always using the IRR 
(16.32%) compared with their British counterpart (42%). Although the con欄
cept of cash fiow is becoming more widely understood in Japan， there stil ex-
ists a gap to be filed in adopting the DCF techniques from the theoretical stan-
dpoint. The J apanese companies are stil slow to adopt them. 
In the case study undertaken by Yamamoto (forthcoming)，社 isnoticed 
that Japanese companies had a different understanding of risk. Namely， 
Japanese companies tended to allow riskier investment projects by loosening 
the appraisal criteria. By doing so， more strategic (=riskier) projects have 
been realized. This can also be seen in Table 4 which deals with risk appraisal 
methods. In addition to the original questions designed by Pike and Wolfe 
(1988)， two more questions were asked. These were; whether the Japanese com-
panies appraise risk by lengthening payback period; and whether they do it by 
lowering required rate of return. Theoretically， riskier projects should be ap-
praised with the shorter payback period or the higher required rate of return to 
absorb risk (Pike， 1985). But 33.52% of the Japanese companies allowed for 
longer payback periods and 32.00% for lower required rates of return. This is 
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Table 4 RISK APPRAISAL勘fETHODS
Japan 1996 
Firms which appraise risk by: Total No Yes Rarely Often Mostly Always 
Shortening payback period 188 25 163 37 53 41 32 
100% 13.30 86.70 19.68 28.19 21.81 17.02 
UK 1986 100% 39 61 17 32 10 2 
Lengthening payback period 179 119 60 37 15 8 。
100% 66.48 33.52 20.67 8.38 4.47 0.00 
Raising required 179 68 111 32 40 24 15 
rate of return 100% 37.99 62.01 17.88 22.35 13.41 8.38 
UK 1986 100% 39 61 13 22 20 6 
Lowering required 175 119 56 34 15 7 o 
rate of return 100% 68.00 32.00 19.43 8.57 4.00 0.00 
Probability analysis 175 139 36 17 15 2 2 
100% 79.43 20.57 9.71 8.57 1.14 1.14 
UK 1986 100% 60 40 22 13 2 3 
Sensitivity Analysis 175 125 50 14 18 12 6 
100% 71.43 28.57 8.00 10.29 6.86 3.43 
UK 1986 100% 29 71 15 23 ' 15 18 
Beta analysis 167 153 14 8 4 
100% 91.62 8.38 4.79 2.40 0.60 0.60 
UK 1986 100% 84 16 12 2 。 2 
also an interesting finding from this survey. Such techniques are， atleast， 
thought to be consistent with strategic goals in Japan. 
Another finding in Table 4 isthat the J apanese companies did not show 
their interest in other risk analysis techniques such as probability analysis 
(20.57%; see 40% in the UK)， sensitivity analysis (28.57%; 71 % in the UK) or 
the capital asset pricing model (8.38%; 16% in the UK). Despite the recent de-
velopment of the finance theory， the nonfinancial companies such as manufac-
turing ones are sti1 unfamiliar with beta an叫ysisin both countries. As was in-
sisted in Takatera and Yamamoto (1989)， Japanese companies might also have 
different attitudes towards risk， inconjunction with their orientation to ac-
crual accounting techniques. The Japanese companies seem not to actively 
quantify risk or to discount uncertain future. This may remain a very serious is-
sue to be discussed. 
Such a lack of interest in risk analysis techniques was also seen in the case 
with management science techniques (Table 5). Although the Japanese compa-
nies practised mathematica1 programming and computer simulation at the 
1986 UK level， both decision theory and critical path analysis scored only les 
than 20%. These are indeed very low scores which need an explanation with a 
certain logic. 
To summarize here as regards formal information systems， the Japanese 
companies may strategically have different approach to the use of project ap-
praisal and risk analysis techniques. To understand why such a difference ex-
-6-
Table 5 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE TECHNIQUES 
Japan 1996 
Firms which use: Total No Yes Rarely Often 肘lostly Always 
Mathematical programming 188 140 48 12 15 13 8 
100% 74.47 25.53 6.38 7.98 6.91 4.26 
UK 1986 100% 79 21 12 4 2 3 
Computer sImulation 191 11 80 31 20 15 14 
100% 58.12 41.8 16.23 10.47 7.85 7.33 
UK 1986 100% 60 40 21 10 6 3 
Decision theory 187 161 26 13 7 2 4 
100% 86.10 13.90 6.95 3.74 1.07 2.14 
UK 1986 100% 66 34 21 9 I 3 
CriticaI path analysis 184 151 3 15 12 3 3 
100% 82.07 17.93 8.15 6.52 1.63 1.63 
UK 1986 100% 51 49 17 18 8 6 
ists， itis necessary to analyse what kinds of goals and objectives the Japanese 
companies have. For strategy emerges from such goals and objectives. This is 
undertaken in the following sections. 
II. STRATEGIC INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS 
Strategic Plaoniog Systems 
1n this section， questions were originally designed so as to illustrate how in-
vestment decisions were made in the Japanese organizations. Researchers in 
capital investment， such as But1er et al. (1993) and Gordon and Pinches (1984)， 
have recognized that four phases can be distinguished in the organizational de-
cision process. Namely investment projects must first be identified， then devel-
oped， and selected. After the projects are selected， they must be controlled. As 
Gordon and Pinches put it: 
. . capital budgeting process can be categorized into four general phases: 
(1) identification of the fact that a capital expenditure may be necessary in 
response to an organizational opportunity or problem， (2)development of 
alternative capital projects that may solve or take advantage of the iden-
tIfied opportunity or problem， (3) selection or the choice of one or more 
capital projects for implementation， and (4) control or evaluation of the 
performance of the capital expenditure (1984， p.8). 
1dentification， development， selection and control are， therefore， recognized 
as the phases constituting the total investment decision process.3 Such an in-
3Pike and Dobbins (1986， pp. 294-5) have recognized the following four phases; 
project generation， project evaluation， project authorization and project implementa-
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vestment decision process is regarded as a typical example of the strategic deci-
sion making process (Gordon and Pinches， 1984). In making an investment de-
cision， various information systems are used in organizations; not merely these 
discussed in the previous section. Different information systems may be used， 
and thereby di旺'erentsubunits can be committed in different phases of the or-
ganizational process. 
At the identification phase where possible opportunities for capital invest-
ment are identified in an organization， the most important formal information 
system is said to be a long-range planning system (Gordon and Pinches， 1984). 
Based on the organizational goal system， long-range plans are formulated to 
shape corporate strategy (Yamamoto， 1995). Investment projects are recog-
nized in line with such long-range plans. Table 6 shows that in Japan 3-year 
mid-term corporate plans are most widely used for investment decisions 
(83.25%). Many Japanese companies practised both long-term corporate plans 
and mid-term corporate plans; the former configures corporate strategy， whi1e 
the latter gives a link between strategy and annual budget. 
Once investment projects are identified， they are then developed in accor-
dance with financial procedures already discussed in Table 1. In financial 
terms， concepts of capital investment are visualized. Accounting， including 
budgeting， plays a vital role in this phase. As Hopwood said: 
. . accounting is now starting to be seen as being more actively construct-
ed in order to create a particular economic visibility within the organiza-
tion and powerful means for positively enabling the governance and coな
trol of the organization along economic lines (1989， pp. 147-8). 
Table 7 thereby asks how concretely capital investment projects are defined in 
the planning context. Almost al the J apanese companies had some definition 
Table 6 LONG-RANGE PLANNING SYSTEMS 
Firms wruch practice: 
Long-term plan beyond 5 years 
5・yearlong-term plan 
3-year mid-term plan 
Plan without time horizon 
Total 
190 
192 
197 
184 
Japan 1996 
No % 
159 83.68 
125 65.10 
3 16.75 
152 82.61 
Yes 
31 
67 
164 
32 
% 
16.32 
34.90 
83.25 
17.39 
tion. Despite the difference of terminology， their discussion of each phase is the same 
as that of Butler et al. (1993) and Gordon and Pinches (1984). 
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Table 7 INVESTMENT POLICY 
Firms which have plans with: 
Concrete definition on projects in details 
Concrete budget in monetary terms 
Concrete direction to be invested 
Broad direction to be invested 
No definition on investment 
Tota! response 
43 
44 
41 
67 
196 
Japan 1996 
% 
21.94 
22.45 
20.92 
34.18 
0.52 
100 
on investment policy in their plans. About a quarter of the respondents had 
concrete definition on investment projects (21.94%). Indeed， it is important to 
recognize that capital budgeting is a part of budgetary control. 
Organizational Decision Making 
After investment projects are formalized with financial procedures， (some 
of) the projects are selected to be implemented， as“decision". Table 8 distin-
guishes between “substantial decision" and “final approval" (or formal deci-
sion). As has been recognized by many researchers (Bower， 1970， and Marsh et 
a!， 1988)， top executives who are theoretically regarded as“decision maker" 
do not make a substantial decision. They usually give authorization to projects 
already selected in an organization. Their roles are， therefore， more indirect 
and strategic in nature; such as clearing organizational goals and objectives， 
leading the organizational decision process as a whole and motivating those 
who are directly committed to the investment project， inorder for their favora-
ble projects to be proposed to them. Seen in such terms， substantial decisions 
may have been made earlier in process and lower in hierarchy. This is the rea-
son why substantial decisions and formal decisions are to be distinguished. 
Table 8 illustrates that substantial decisions were made at various levels. 
J apanese companies often set up a management committee which consists of 
selected members of the Board of Directors (Yamamoto， forthcoming). Be-
sides the Board of Directors， the management committee， usually called 
Jomukai，日exiblydeals with strategic issues including capital investment. 
A1though this was the most popular case (31.84%)， substantial decisions were 
also made at the division (12.94%)， the division headquarters (11.94%)， the 
Board of Directors (12.94%) and other committees which were especially set 
up for the purpose of investment decision making (21.39%). Some companies 
distinguished the level of substantial decision making based on the size of 
projects. The larger investment projects in amount were accepted at the higher 
hierarchicallevel， and vice versa. These cases were included in the category of 
“other" (8.96%). 
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Table 8 ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Japan 1996 
Firms which make decisions at SubstantiaI Final Project 
decision approvaI proposaI 
% % % 
Board of Directors 26 12.94 106 52.74 
Management committee 64 31.84 75 37.31 
SpeciaI committee 43 21.39 5 2.49 
DIvisionaI HQ 24 11.94 36 17.91 
DivisIon 26 12.94 88 43.78 
PlannIng department 37 18.41 
Accounting department 14 6.97 
Other subunit 18 8.96 15 7.46 26 12.94 
TotaI response 201 100 201 100 201 100 
Regardless of where substantial decisions were made， formal approval was 
mostly made at the Board of Directors (52.74%). This is because ofthe require-
ment of law. When a formal decision was made at the top level， details and con-
tents of the project were presented by some subunits. This role was divided 
into two categorical cases. In the first case， project proposal was undertaken 
by those which were directly committed to the projectper se: division (43.78%) 
and division headquarters (17.91 %). 
The other case was that investment projects were presented by staff depart-
ments: the corporate planning department (18.41 %) and the accounting depart-
ment (6.97%). Yamamoto (forthcoming) has recognized that there is a compe陶
tition or trade-o町betweenthe corporate planning department and the account陶
ing department concerning which leads the investment decision process as 
staf. This is also seen in the table. The corporate planning department was 
more often committed to the investment decision process than the accounting 
department. The accounting department plays the les significant role in J apan 
as recognized by Takatera and Yamamoto (1989). Seen in such terms， the per自
son fully engaged in capital.budgeting (Table 1) may not necess紅ilybelong to 
the accounting department. 
Table 9 shows how investment projects are accepted at the substantial deci-
sion; not at the final approval. Of 23.12% of the respondents， althe projects 
were accepted even at this level. (Is this really a substantial decision?) The 
highest score of the rate of project adoption at the substantial decision was be-
tween 50-74% (32.26%). A1most al the companies had the adoption rate 
higher than 50%， neverthe1ess in Table 2 they suggested a specific search and 
screening of alternatives.4 
4Lower rates of projects rejection were also seen in other countries (Bower， 1970， and 
Marsh et al.， 1988). 
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Table 9 RATE OF PROJECT ADOPTION AT THE SUBSTANTIAL DECISION 
100% 
90-99% 
75-89% 
50-74% 
25-49% 
Below 25% 
Total response 
43 
4 
56 
60 
19 
4 
186 
Japan 1996 
% 
23.12 
2.15 
30.11 
32.26 
10.22 
2.15 
100 
Table 10 HURDLE RATE FOR NORMAL.RISK PROJECTS 
After tax in monetary terms 
25% and more 
20-24% 
15-19% 
10-14% 
5-9% 
Below 5% 
Total response 
3 
4 
18 
44 
83 
19 
171 
Japan 1996 
% 
1.75 
2.34 
10.53 
25.73 
48.54 
11.1 
100 
In Table 10， formal hurdle rates for normal-risk projects used at the fina1 
level were asked. More than half the respondent companies set the after-tax 
hurdle rate less than 10%. Such lower hurdle rates can be explained by the low 
market interest rates， such as the prime rate， and low inflation in Japan. Such 
low hurdle rates may also explain the reason why DCF techniques are not so 
popular in Japan. If the cost of capita1 is not high， the accounting rate of 
return method can be used as a simpler substitute to the IRR (Takatera and 
Yamamoto， 1989). Due to the same reason， the payback method is not dis-
counted in Japan， either. 
When the investment project is selected， itis then implemented and con-
trolled. As an information system， post-auditing is an important vehicle at this 
control phase. As Mills and Kennedy insisted: 
A post-completion audit therefore provides a mechanism whereby ex-
perience， good or bad， gained from past and/or current projects， can be 
formally fed back into the company's investment process in order to im-
prove current and future company performance (1990， p.2). 
As was already seen in Table 1， however， post-auditing has not yet been 
enough dispersed among the Japanese companies. It must be emphasized that 
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the investment decision process does not end when projects are selected.5 Con嗣
trolling and reviewing can play an important part in increasing capital budget-
ing effectiveness. 
It is， thus， clear that investment decision making is a long organizational 
process in which various subunits are involved. Different information systems 
function in different phases. 
IV. OBJECTIVES AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Financial Objectives 
In this section， what kinds of financial objectives and goals the Japanese 
companies have in making investment decisions is to be analysed. In Table 11， 
two questions on short-term financial objectives (profitability and profit) and 
three questions on long-term ones (growth in sales or assets， inearnings or 
earnings per share (EPS)， and in shareholders' wealth) were asked， with the 
related two factors on investment decision making.6 
It is often said that Japanese companies have longer viewpoint vis-a-vis 
Western counterparts. The table， however， shows that the Japanese companies 
gave more emphasis to short-term objectives if the objectives were defined in 
financial terms. As regards profitability， 24.49% said“very important"; so 
was 27.50% in the case of profit. But as regards growth in sales or assets， 
growth in earnings or EPS， growth in shareholders' wealth， they scored 
18.69%，20.20% and 8.76% respectively. The latter three scores are compara-
bly low against the former two. Among them， the Japanese companies did not 
regard the growth in shareholders' wea1th as an important financial objective. 
Less than half the respondents regarded it as“important" and “very im-
portant"・'
In Table 11， more Japanese companies emphasized the importance of 
qualitative factors in making investment decisions than British ones. This 
resu1t is also consistent with their less interest in DCF， rational risk analysis 
techniques and financial markets. The Japanese companies make more of 
qualitative aspects. By the same token， the Japanese companies were less in-
terested in systematic and highly-developed capital budgeting systems than the 
5A problem occurs in eva1uating project's performance when DCF techniques are used 
in the selection phase (Ijiri， 1978). That is a mismatch between DCF data for project 
appraisal and accrual accounting data which are usually used for performance evalua-
tion. Takatera and Yamamoto (1989) suggested that Japanese companies could avoid 
this problem by applying the accrual accounting data for both purposes. 
6These questions were adopted from the Pike's questionnaire. But their survey results 
were not presented in Pike and Wolfe (1988). 
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Table 11 IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES AND RELATED FACTORS 
Japan 1996 
Tota1 Not Below average Average Important Very 
important importance importance important 
Sbort term (1-3 years) 
Profitability 196 3 1 45 89 48 
100% 1.53 5.61 22.96 45.41 24.49 
Profit 200 3 4 37 101 55 
100% 1.50 2.00 18.50 50.50 27.50 
Long term (over 3 
years) 
Growth in 198 O 10 52 99 37 
sales or assets 100% 0.00 5.05 26.26 50.00 18.69 
Growth in 198 O 12 50 96 40 
earnings or EPS 100% 0.00 6.06 25.25 48.48 20.20 
Growth in 194 4 20 89 64 17 
shareholders' wea1th 100% 2.06 10.31 45.88 32.99 8.76 
Related factors 
Qualitative factors 197 2 10 77 84 24 
100% 1.02 5.08 39.09 42.64 12.18 
UK 1986 100% 。 。 49 38 13 
Systematic capital 198 3 27 98 64 6 
budgeting systems 100% 1.52 13.64 49.49 32.32 3.03 
UK 1986 100% NA NA NA 39 23 
Table 12 CONSTRAINTS ON THE SIZE OF INVEST島ffiNTPROGRAMME 
Japan 1996 
Total Not Below average Average Important Very 
important importance importance lmportant 
Lack of capital 199 52 72 51 22 2 
from capital market 100% 26.13 36.18 25.63 11.06 1.01 
UnwilIing to 199 23 54 65 48 9 
increase borrowings 100% 11.56 27.14 32.66 24.12 4.52 
Lack of 199 8 34 77 69 1 
investment opportunity 100% 4.02 17.09 38.69 34.67 5.53 
Lack of 198 17 43 95 39 4 
trained managers 100% 8.59 21.72 47.98 19.70 2.02 
General 198 2 1 58 97 30 
economic uncertamty 100% 1.01 5.56 29.29 48.99 15.15 
British counterparts were. Only 3.03 % of the J apanese respondents regarded a 
sophisticated capital budgeting system as “very important" vis・d・.vis23% in 
the UK. This is a very much notable difference between this study and that of 
Pike and Wolfe (1988). There may not exist a relationship between a highly-de-
veloped capital budgeting system and its effectiveness. 
The s由hort-幽幽幽幽幽幽幽却幽
t“ives are finanιcially defined， can also be seen in Table 12. Lack of capital availa-
13 
ble from capita1 market was not regarded白血importantconstraint on the 
size of investment programme (26.13% as “not important"， and 36.18% as 
“below average importance"). Concepts related to the outside of organiza-
tions， such as capita1 market and shareholders' wea1th， are not significantly 
considered in J apan. Itami compared capital allocation between the US and 
Japan and noted in the following terms: 
1n comparison the relation between the capital market and the firm in the 
United States more closely resembles that of a pure market relation. 1nter-
na1 capita1 markets a1so seem more developed in the United States than in 
Japan. This is evident from the fact that the interna1 financing ratio of the 
U.S. firm is much greater than that of the Japanese (1986， p.71). 
He a1so noticed the les accounting orientation of the Japanese companies (Ita-
mi， 1986， p.72). 
The “lack of trained managers" who are capable of implementing invest-
ment opportunities also scored low. Together with the comparative high score 
of “at least one person fully engaged in capital 'budgeting" in Table 1， 
Japanese companies tended not to regard human resource management as a 
serious issue. So-ca1ed “Japanese management" emphasizes such human 
aspects. This result may imply that the Japanese companies are more intraor-
ganizationa1-oriented given that they are les interested in the externa1 market. 
The most important constraint on the size of investment programme was 
“genera1 economic uncertainty" (48.99% as“important" and 15.15% as“v-
ery important"). Japanese companies enjoyed economic prosperity in the 
1980s. But the bubble economy ended in the ear1y 1990s. They were then em-
bedded in the serious recession. The answer symbolizes such a current macro-
economic environment. 
Sophistica値onand Effectiveness 
Fina11y， three questions were asked in Table 13 as regards how capita1 budg-
eting practice changed during last five years. In general terms， sophistication 
has progressed and effectiveness has increased in capital budgeting practice， be 
it in Japan or not (Yamamoto， 1994). Pfeffer and Salancik have defined effec-
tiveness in the fol1owing terms: 
. . effectiveness. . . isa sociopolitica1 question. It may have a basis in eco-
nomic consideration . . . . The concept is not restricted， however， todeci-
sions由atare economica1ly motivated. Rather， itrefl.ects both an assess幽
ment of the usefulness of what is being done and of the resources of that 
are being consumed by the organization (1978， p.1). 
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Table 13 CHANGES IN SOPHISTICATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL 
BUDGETING PRACTICE DURING LAST FIVE YEARS 
Japan 1996 
Total Definitely Less No More Definitely 
les change ロlore
Sophistication 201 2 3 101 81 14 
100% 1.00 1.49 50.25 40.30 6.97 
UK 1986 100% 。 7 33 23 37 
Time 201 4 14 132 47 4 
and costly 100% 1.99 6.97 65.67 23.38 1.99 
Efectivenes 200 4 110 78 7 
100% 0.50 2.00 55.00 39.00 3.50 
UK 1986 100% 。 8 36 32 24 
Although rational decision making may increase efficiency， it may not neces-
sari1y improve effectiveness. Effectiveness is dependent upon organizational 
goals and objectives. In comparison with the UK case， the answers of “definite-
ly more" were significantly low in Japan: 6.97% vかd・vis37% concerning 
sophistication and 3.50% vis-a-vis 24% concerning effectiveness. These results 
also symbolize the slow-pace change of capital budgeting practice in J apan. Be 
that as it may， the results showed that the progress of sophistication and the im-
provement of effectiveness were seen in Japan in the last five years. 
At the same time， inTable 13， about a quar此te町rof the J apanese respondents 
recognized t由ha副tcapital budgeting practice became more “time-co∞ns叩umi泊ngand
c∞。s叫tlyγ"(ο23.3銘8%‘“‘mo町reザ"and1.99%‘“‘'defi白n凶lIt旬el均ymo町re").Although 65.67% of 
the Japanese companies saw no change， the change of environments， such as 
the above-mentioned general economic uncertainty， required more complicat-
ed practice together with the sophistication of capital budgeting systems. 
v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper， a broad analysis in the questionnaire survey has been present-
ed in a comparative way. Some implications have been obtained. First， 
Japanese companies did not make much of capital budgeting techniques per 
se. This was seen in the low scores in DCF， risk analysis techniques and， to
some extent， post-auditing， although the improvement of capital budgeting 
effectiveness was seen in the last five years. Even opposite attitudes to risk anal-
ysis were seen. Such phenomena cannot be explained when the focus is only 
given to formal techniques and procedures. Strategy analysis is indispensable. 
Secondly， these companies did not have serious issues related to human 
resources. At least one person was fully engaged in capital budgeting and the 
lack of trained managers was not a serious constraint in dealing with invest同
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ment opportunities. This might be resulted from the les interest in techniques. 
In other words， the Japanese-style management was seen in capital budgeting 
practice. But the terminology di:fered with organization as the other side of 
com. 
The third implication of the study is that when objectives for capital budget-
ing were defined in financial terms， Japanese companies showed short-term 
orientation with the les interest in financial markets and shareholders. This 
might also be related to the weak orientation to the sophistication of tech-
niques. The Japanese companies were more interested in qualitative factors of 
capital budgeting and possibly nonfinancial objectives which were not well-dis-
cussed in the Pike's questionnaire. E:fectiveness of capital budgeting systems is 
assessed with such organizational objectives. 
If the resu1t obtained in this study is to be compared with the British study 
in a more rational sense， the state of Japan in 1996 can be comparable with 
that of the UK in 1986. Sophistication of capital budgeting practice was seen in 
J apan as had been the case with the UK. But its pace was slower. To improve 
capital budgeting practice， the Japanese companies might be able to refer to 
what happened in the West in the late 1980s if they wanted. 
To conclude; in capital budgeting， the function of formal information sys-
tems， the role of organizational subunits and the goal system of organizations 
are interrelated. A1though the Japanese practice of capital budgeting has its dis-
tinctive characteristics which are quite di:ferent from the rationale presented 
by the finance theory， analysed factors are themselves consistent with one 
another. 
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